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Abstract 
This article analyzes the relationship between two types of performances, one on the 
ground (of a tennis court) and the other on the floor (of the stock market). The empirical 
application looks into the tennis player, Rafael Nadal, and his endorsing firms. The 
findings show a positive reaction in the market value when the tennis player wins 
matches in the Grand Slams, the intriguing effect being the diminishing sensitivity 
pattern that such reaction shows and the absence of loss aversion. 
Keywords: firm value; diminishing sensitivity; loss aversion; tennis; endorsement; 
celebrity endorser. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Many companies rely on high-profile sports events to enhance their brand 
awareness through sponsorship initiatives (Farrell and Frame, 1997; Miyazaki and 
Morgan, 2001; Cornwell et al., 2001; Clark et al., 2009): firms provide financial support 
to the sports event or sports team and the firm’s brand appears during the event. The 
literature on the topic finds a general positive effect on the endorsing firm’s market 
value (Agrawal and Kamakura, 1995; Mathur et al., 1997), with some exceptions, such 
as the results of Ding et al. (2011), which stress the fact that the expenses incurred may 
offset the benefits derived from the endorsement strategy. 
The analyses have focused on the announcement of the endorsement contract 
and its impact on firm value, with the expectation that a celebrity’s potential success 
will be transferred to the company’s name. According to Agrawal and Kamakura 
(1995), firms contract celebrity endorsers because they make advertisements more 
reliable, help people recognize and remember the brand name, generate affect towards 
the brand, and increase the likelihood of individuals choosing the endorsed brand. 
However, a question still remains unresolved. After signing the endorsement 
contract, how is the endorser’s performance affecting the endorsing firm’s 
performance? Farrel et al. (2000) analyzed the case of Tiger Woods, finding a positive 
effect on Nike’s market value and no effect on Fortune Brands and American Express. 
In a similar context, but with no formal endorsement contracts involved, Nicolau (2011) 
finds a significant relationship between Real Madrid’s performance in the Spanish 
Soccer League and the market value of the construction company ACS; and, also in 
soccer, Nicolau (2012) shows that the positive results of the Spanish National team in 
the 2010 FIFA World Cup led to a significant increase in the Spanish tourism industry’s 
market value.  
In this framework of relationships between types of performances, on the ground 
(of a field, a pitch, a golf course, or a tennis court) and on the floor (of the stock 
market), we go a step further and attempt to examine the way specific results of the 
celebrity endorser affect the market value of the endorsing firm. In particular, we test 
whether the reaction in the market value follows the pattern of diminishing sensitivity 
and loss aversion of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) Prospect Theory. As greater 
sports contention leads to greater media coverage (Farrell et al., 2000), we expect that 
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the larger the advantage in the result of a victory is, the greater effect on the market 
value will be, but it will happen up to a point as there must be a satiation point. In other 
words, an “easy victory” will generate less media coverage than a close, hard-fought 
match. According to loss aversion, losing a match should have a greater impact than 
winning. We test these hypotheses on the tennis player Rafael Nadal and his endorsing 
companies, Banesto and Mapfre, by looking at the results of the matches of the four 
major tennis tournaments: the Grand Slams. 
2. RESEARCH DESIGN 
To examine the effect of a tennis player’s performance on the value of the 
endorsing firms we estimate the abnormal returns derived from the player’s 
performance in each match. We use the market model of Sharpe (1963, 1964) to gauge 
the variation in share prices on any given day: it i i t itR RMα β ε= + +  (1) in which Rit 
represents the returns on the firm’s share i on day t, and RMt is the rate of returns on the 
market portfolio on day t. The parameters αi and βi represent the constant and the 
systematic risk on share i, respectively, and εit is the error term. In order to control for 
kurtosis and heteroskedasticity in the error term, we estimate a GARCH (1,1) model 
(Bollerslev, 1986). 
To estimate the abnormal returns derived from the results in each match, 
Karafiath’s (1988) methodology is used. As the interest is in measuring the abnormal 
returns derived from the result in each match, we build a model with a dummy variable 
Dit, which indicates the first trading day after the match on day t and two result 
variables: WINt and LOSSt. Calling SFt sets in favor and SAt sets against, these two 
variables WINt and LOSSt are defined as follows: 
WINt=(SFt-SAt)DW, where DW=1 if SFt-SAt>0  and DW=0 otherwise.  
LOSSt=(SFt-SAt)DL, where DL=1 if SFt-SAt<0  and DL=0 otherwise.   
Therefore, the final market model is: 
itittiittiittiittimtiiit DLOSSDLOSSDWINDWINRR εξτδθβα ++++++= 22   (2) 
According to Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) Prospect Theory, diminishing 
sensitivity will be detected if θi>0 and δi<0, and loss aversion if τi/θi>1. 
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We apply the empirical analysis to the case of Rafael Nadal, the best Spanish 
tennis player these days, and his endorsing firms: Banesto (whose endorsement contract 
was initiated on October 24, 2007) and Mapfre (from February 16, 2009). We collect 
the daily returns and build an aggregate return measure formed by the average of the 
two companies’ daily returns, from February 16, 2009 through April 20, 2012. We 
focus on the Grand Slam tennis tournaments (Australian Open, Roland Garros, 
Wimbledon and US Open), and the results of the 85 matches that he played are obtained 
from the Worldwide Tennis Database and Tennis Navigator. 
3. RESULTS 
Table 1 presents the parameter estimates for the effect of winning a tennis match 
in the Grand Slams. We find a significantly positive parameter for the variable WIN, 
which represents abnormal returns for the day after Nadal winning a match; thus, 
Nadal’s victory seems to have a positive effect on his endorsing firms’ value, in line 
with Farrel et al. (2000). Also, a significant and negative parameter is found for the 
variable WIN2, showing a diminishing sensitivity pattern and favoring the hypothesis of 
diminishing sensitivity.  
“Insert Table 1 about here” 
Graph 1 shows that winning by an advantage of one or two sets brings about a 
similar effect on the market value; but the impact of beating the opponent by three sets 
of difference is much lower.  
“Insert Graph 1 about here” 
It seems that, easy victories are not as hyped as closer ones; the latter gaining 
greater media coverage. To confirm this statement, we search the headlines made by the 
tennis player in the following day after each match won. We use the Factiva database 
for this purpose, identifying headlines in national and international newspapers. Table 2 
shows the average number of headlines after each match won, for each possible set 
difference in the victory. A common pattern is found for total, national, and 
international headlines: the closer the victory, the greater the media coverage. We 
conduct ANOVAs and find that these differences are significant at 0.01 in all cases 
(total, national, and international newspapers). The Scheffé tests show significant 
differences in the number of news items between 1-set and 3-set victories, and between 
2-set and 3-set victories; and no difference is found between 1-set and 2-set victory. 
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This result is confirmed again for total, national, and international newspapers, and is in 
line with the diminishing sensitivity found in Table 1 and displayed in Graph 1: winning 
by one or two sets leads to a greater effect on the market value than winning by three 
sets. 
“Insert Table 2 about here” 
Additionally, as a complement to this view of diminishing sensitivity, we 
attempt to see, in a descriptive way, whether it holds across matches, i.e. whether the 
marginal effect of each additional victory on market value diminishes. If Rafa Nadal 
wins multiple games in a row, people might “get used to” him winning, and the nth win 
may have little effect. If he loses a match, however, the curve might “reset” and the next 
win might suddenly have a much bigger impact. Graph 2 shows the abnormal returns 
for the nth match after a lost match, and a diminishing trend is observed. This result, 
however, is not conclusive at all, because the athlete only lost nine matches out of the 
eighty-five matches in the study period, what means that there are only nine 
observations to test whether the “curve resets”. Nevertheless, while this is a preliminary 
result, and very descriptive in nature, it does open up a new avenue for research. 
“Insert Graph 2 about here” 
As for the parameters associated with the variables LOSS and LOSS2, they seem 
to have no significant effect on market value. Similar to the diminishing sensitivity 
property, we look at the headlines made by the tennis player in the following day after 
each match: if Nadal did not receive as much coverage in lost as in won matches, this 
could help explain why there is no market response to his lost matches. Table 3 shows, 
however, that the average number of headlines after won and lost matches does not 
differ significantly from each other1. Also, we introduce the variable “number of 
headlines the day after a match” into the market model (Eq. 1), and find that it exerts a 
positive and significant effect (p<0.05) only after Nadal winning a match; if he loses a 
match the number of headlines does not have any significant influence (p=0.628).  
“Insert Table 3 about here” 
Therefore, we have “good news” (winning a match) bringing about positive 
market reactions -as expected-, and “allegedly bad news” (losing a match) having no 
                                                 
1 We also control for outliers by applying the 5% trimming fraction, and the same non significant results 
are found in the three ANOVAs: F=0.003 (p=0.956); F=1.277 (p=0.262); F=0.202 (p=0.654). 
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effect at all -which is contrary to loss aversion-. It seems that this bad news is not so bad 
after all, or maybe they are not even bad at all. On the one hand, if we have to construe 
losing a tennis match as negative publicity, it is important to remember that negative 
publicity might not be all bad (Berger  et al., 2010); and on the other hand, if we 
consider losing a match an “undesirable event”, its effect would depend on the 
blameworthiness of the endorser (Louie et al., 2001).  
But, to what extent is losing a tennis match an “undesirable event” that creates 
bad publicity? Louie et al. (2001) find that low blame undesirable events might even 
increase firm value as they can promote sympathy, liking and visibility of the endorser; 
what is more, in the case of professional athletes, they are usually afforded a hero status 
by their fans, who might have a higher tolerance for their blameworthy actions. 
Certainly, losing a match is something “not desired”, and as such, it is an 
“undesirable event”; but it happens within the sports arena and is part of the game. In 
fact, when one has to rate an athlete’s attitude on the sports ground -from blamelessness 
to blameworthiness- to explain a sports result, it comes out as a relative question. In the 
particular case of Rafa Nadal, he is known to put his all into every game, and if he ends 
up losing it is not because of lack of effort. Obviously, his responsibility in the final 
result -for better or worse- is shared with his opponent (i.e. how well the other has 
played), so neither of them has to shoulder this responsibility a hundred percent. A 
different story would be if the athlete started to lose many matches in a row, as it could 
imply he is not in good shape. Remember, however, that we have had trouble in the 
sample size of lost matches because of its scarcity (for example, in the sample, no two 
losses were consecutive, and the average amount of wins in a row is 9, with a minimum 
of 3 and a maximum of 20).  
Consequently, losing a match, while being undesirable, is regarded as a normal 
part of the game, with shared responsibility and, in the case of Rafa Nadal, something 
that happens not regularly and only every now and then. This can explain that, although 
being it an unanticipated event, the market remains neutral and there is no effect on the 
firm value of the endorsing firms. Indeed, the unanticipated event would be the athlete 
losing more than one (or two) matches in a row but, as indicated, that would be another 
story. 
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4. DISCUSSION 
This article analyzes the relationship between two types of performance, one on 
the ground (of a tennis court, to be specific) and the other on the floor (of the stock 
market). The empirical application carried out on the tennis player, Rafael Nadal, and 
his endorsing firms shows that the market value of the firms reacts positively to the 
victories of the celebrity endorser in the Grand Slams, with a diminishing sensitivity 
pattern, in line with Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) Prospect Theory. However, loss 
aversion is not observed. 
Firms contract celebrity endorsers with the expectation that a celebrity’s 
potential success will be transferred to the company’s name. This article shows that the 
performance of the celebrity is effectively transferred to the firm’s value, following a 
pattern with which close and hard-fought victories bring about a greater effect on firm 
value than easy wins, and single, one-off losses do not seem to have any impact. 
Obviously, a key point in this context and, in turn, a relevant implication, is the right 
selection of the celebrity. 
Two research threads can follow these results: 1) according to the preliminary 
results found in the diminishing sensitivity pattern “insinuated” as to the marginal effect 
of each additional victory on market value, it could be interesting to see, with a larger 
sample of lost matches,  whether the “reset” of the curve exists; and 2) as each “type” of 
sports result (e.g. win, lost, close win, close lost, easy win, easy lost) seems to generate 
a different number of headlines, it could be insightful to directly relate both, number of 
headlines derived from a sports result and reactions in the market value.  
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Table 1. Effect of Grand Slam matches on firm value 
Variables Parameters Standard deviation 
z-
statistic 
Market portfolio 
(Rm) 
0.9666 0.0191 50.3 
Set difference x Won match  
(WIN) 
0.0107 0.0032 3.31 
(Set difference x Won match)2 
(WIN2) 
-0.0035 0.0011 -3.05 
Set difference x Lost match  
(LOSS) 
-0.0071 0.0047 -1.49 
(Set difference x Lost match)2 
(LOSS2) 
-0.0023 0.0018 -1.26 
α -0.0004 0.0003 -1.27 
c 3E-06 8E-07 4.53 
λArch(1) 0.0548 0.0163 3.35 
δGarch(1) 0.9073 0.0187 48.44 
F-statistic 225.57 
R-squared 0.69 
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Table 2. Average number of headlines per match and per set difference 
Set difference in 
the win 
Total No. of 
headlines (average) 
Total No. of national 
headlines (average) 
Total No. of international 
headlines (average) 
1 120 43 77 
2 80 30 50 
3 50 21 29 
Anova  
test 
10.08  
(p<0.01) 
9.71 
(p<0.01) 
8.55 
(p<0.01) 
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Table 3. Average number of headlines per won and lost match  
Set difference in 
the win 
Total No. of 
headlines (average) 
Total No. of national 
headlines (average) 
Total No. of international 
headlines (average) 
Won match 61 24 37 
Lost match 65 19 47 
Anova  
test 
0.060 
(p=0.76) 
1.439 
(p=0.234) 
0.812 
(p=0.370) 
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Graph 1. The effect of set difference on market value 
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Graph 2. Abnormal returns for the nth match after a lost match 
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The last match of the 85 matches was a lost, so we are left with 8 lost matches to analyze 
the reactions of the subsequent won matches. We average the abnormal returns of the 
won matches after each lost match; therefore, as the minimum number of consecutive 
victories is four, to present the average values with coherence, this graph shows the 
abnormal reactions for the first four won matches after a lost match (after the four match, 
the number of observations start to decrease).  
 
